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It has now become widely accepted that economic decisions are influenced by cognitive
and emotional processes. In the present study, we aimed at disentangling the neural
mechanisms associated with the way in which the information is formulated, i.e., framing
effect, in terms of gain or loss, which influences people’s decisions. Participants played
a fMRI version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) where we manipulated bids through two
different frames: the expression “I give you” (gain) focusing on money the respondent
would receive if she/he agreed with the proponent, and the expression “I take” (loss)
focusing on the money that would be removed from the respondent in the event that
she/he accepted the offer. Neuroimaging data revealed a frame by response interaction,
showing an increase of neural activity in the right rolandic operculum/insular cortex, the
anterior cingulate, among other regions, for accepting the frame “I take” vs. rejecting,
as compared to accepting the frame “I give you” vs. rejecting. In addition, the left
occipito-temporal junction was activated for “I take” vs. “I give you” for offer 5,
corresponding to the equal offer made unpleasant by the presence of the frame “I take,”
where is the proposer that takes the money. Our data extend the current understanding of
the neural substrates of social decision making, by disentangling the structures sensitive
to the way in which the information is formulated (i.e., framing effect), in terms of gain
or loss.
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INTRODUCTION
Cross-field research in experimental economics and cognitive
psychology has clearly demonstrated how both the cognitive and
emotional processes may influence economical decision-making
(Bechara et al., 1997; Sanfey et al., 2003; Naqvi et al., 2006).
More critically, these studies unveiled the limits of the the-
ory of rationality proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1947).
In the Ultimatum Game (UG), two players are asked to divide
a given amount of money: the proponent must decide how this
money should be divided, while the responder may accept or
reject the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, both players
receive the agreed amount, but if the responder rejects, neither
of them gets anything. What has been observed is that when par-
ticipants play as responders, they tend to reject about 5 of bids
below the 2–3 of the total (Henrich et al., 2001), behaving against
the predictions of classical economic theories of monetary max-
imization of utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), as
even the acceptance of an offer would constitute a minimal gain,
and, as such, worth being accepted. The UG violates the clas-
sic assumption of the homo economicus, in that people prefer to
reject a sure amount of money rather than accepting an unfair
division. In order to explain this behavior, behavioral economists
developed the concept of social preference, defined as a con-
cern for the payoffs of other relevant agents in addition to the
concern for one’s own payoff (Carpenter, 2008), and proposed
different accounts. According to one account, focused on the dis-
tribution of the outcomes, the individuals reject unequal offers
because they have a preference for equal outcome (e.g., Bolton,
1991; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The second account focuses on
intentions, and claims that people reject unfair offers in order
to punish the socially unacceptable behavior of the proposer.
From a psychological point of view, negative emotions, such as
frustration, have been proposed as being the ultimate cause of
the rejections (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996), and psychophys-
iological, imaging and neuropsychological evidence supports this
interpretation.
Van’t Wout and colleagues, for instance, found that increased
skin conductance response, a measure of emotional arousal, was
associated with the rejection, compared to acceptance, of unfair
offers (van’t Wout et al., 2006). Sanfey et al. (2003), on the other
hand, interpreted the stronger activation of anterior insula asso-
ciated with rejection of unfairness as a sign of emotional arousal,
as this area had traditionally been linked to negative emotions
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such as disgust (Sanfey et al., 2003). Koenigs and Tranel (2007)
found that patients with a lesion to the vmPFC increased their
rate of rejections for unfair offers, interpreting this result as a
sign of a deficit in controlling frustration (Koenigs and Tranel,
2007). Interestingly, Moretti et al. (2009) confirmed that a lesion
in the vmPFC led to an increased rate of rejection of unfair
offers, but only when they were presented as future abstract
outcomes; instead, when money was physically present during
the interaction, their rate were no different from the control
group (Moretti et al., 2009). This latter finding suggests that the
vmPFC is involved in representing the value of future abstract
rewards rather than in controlling negative emotions elicited by
unfairness. Further evidence in support to the involvement of
mechanisms other than negative emotional arousal is provided
by Civai et al. (2010), who found that participants were more
aroused when they rejected, as opposed to when they accepted,
unfair offers for themselves: when asked to decide on behalf of an
unknown third party, subjects rejected the same amount of unfair
offers, but they showed no difference in the emotional arousal
between rejection and acceptances (Civai et al., 2010). It could be
possible that the increased arousal in myself condition is driven
by the fact that subjects incur in the cost of rejecting, whereas
in the third-party condition they do not; however, more recent
behavioral data showed that, in other situations, the unfairness of
the division does not prevent acceptance when the offer is advan-
tageous for the responder (Civai et al., 2012, 2013), suggesting
that other mechanisms besides pure perception of unfairness may
drive the behavior inmyself condition (e.g., willing to be better off
the other player). By applying this same self-other manipulation,
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al. (2012) found that the medial prefrontal
cortex was associated to rejections in the self condition, whereas
the anterior insula was associated with rejection in third party
condition (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012), and suggested that
the activation in anterior insula is triggered by social norm vio-
lation (e.g., King-Casas et al., 2008) and not just by emotional
arousal [for a discussion on this issue, see Civai (2013), in this
special issue].
In the domain of economics, a number of studies demon-
strated that decision-making is strongly affected by gain and
loss contexts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; De Martino et al.,
2006). Specifically, in a modified version of the UG, participants’
responses were compared in gain and loss sharing (Zhou andWu,
2011). In the gain condition, the standard rules of the UG were
applied. In the loss condition, accepting the offer led to the pro-
posed division of the loss between players, whereas rejecting the
offer led both players to lose the total amount of money. Results
showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were higher in
the loss than in the gain condition. Other studies have demon-
strated that the perception of ownership of property affects the
way proposers make offers in the UG. In particular, proposers
allocated more chips to the responder in the taking (i.e., the
property is located at the responder, and the proposer decides
how many chips to take from the responder) than in the giv-
ing condition (i.e., the property is located at the proposer, and
the responders decides how many chips to give to the responder)
(Leliveld et al., 2008). Indeed, the way in which the informa-
tion is formulated, in terms of gain or loss, has been found to
influence people’s decisions. This effect is known in literature as
the framing effect, which is one of the psychological phenomena
explained within the prospect theory framework (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), whereby people: (a) perceive the different options
in terms of potential gains or potential losses compared with a
neutral reference point, (b) consider the losses most salient than
the corresponding gains (the unpleasantness of losing Euro 1000
is a stronger feeling than the pleasantness of winning the same
amount), and (c) are more inclined to make risky choices in the
domain of losses.
In the classic UG, offers are typically formulated so as to pro-
vide the respondent with all the information on how the money
will be distributed between the two players: for example, if the
sum to be divided is 10 euros, the offer is worded as “I take 8
Euro/You take 2 Euro” (Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006;
Moretti et al., 2009). However, the two pieces of information are
complementary. Therefore, on the one hand, one piece of infor-
mation might be sufficient to make a decision, on the other, the
way the offer is framed might well affect decision-making.
In a previous psychophysiological study (Sarlo et al., 2012),
some of us used a modified version of the UG in which bids were
manipulated through two different frames: the expression “I give
you” was considered as a gain frame, since it focuses on money
the respondent would receive if she agreed with the proponent;
on the contrary, the expression “I take” was considered to frame
the losses, since it is focused on the money that would be removed
from the respondent in the event that she accepted the offer. Heart
rate and skin conductance were also recorded in response to offers
as indices of physiological activation. The results indicated that
manipulating the frame had an effect both at the behavioral and
physiological levels in males only. They showed a psychophysio-
logical pattern suggesting a defense response (increased heart rate
and skin conductance) when the offer was framed as a loss rather
than as a gain, and a higher rate of rejection under the loss than
the gain frame with mid-value offers (3 out of 10C). Accordingly,
in the present study we hypothesized that the frame “I take” might
elicit stronger bodily responses because it might be interpreted
more negatively.
The framing effect has been investigated in two previous neu-
roimaging studies using a financial decision-making task (De
Martino et al., 2006; Roiser et al., 2009). Consistent with the
prospect theory assumptions, participants preferred the sure over
the gamble options in the gain frame condition, and chose the
gamble over the sure options in the loss frame condition. fMRI
data showed that choices consistent with such framing effect
were associated with amygdala activity, likely reflecting automatic
emotional reactions (but see also Talmi et al., 2010). Other studies
have indicated that risk aversion may also be mediated by activa-
tion of the anterior insula (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Liu et al.,
2007), suggesting that enhanced sensitivity to loss-framed infor-
mation is associated with negative emotions and reward-related
processing (Phan et al., 2002).
This is the first study to date that has investigated the neural
mechanisms underlying framing effect in the UG. Based on these
extant literature, first we expected to replicate the findings that
correlate the activation of areas previously associated with unfair-
ness, such as medial prefrontal cortex and anterior insula, to the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 337 | 2
Tomasino et al. Framing and ultimatum game
type of response; moreover, we predicted a significant effect of
loss (“I take”) vs. gain (“I give you”) frame in emotional areas
such as the amygdala and anterior insula.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 17 males right-handed [mean ± SD: 93.5 ± 9.9,
Edinburgh Inventory test, (Oldfield, 1971)] healthy subjects
(mean age ± SD: 27.35 ± 3.88 years; age range: 22–36) were
included. Male subjects were preferred to female subjects because
in Sarlo et al. (2012) they more consistently showed the effect of
frame. All subjects were native speakers of Italian with compa-
rable levels of education. All subjects had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and reported no history of neurological illness,
psychiatric disease, or drug abuse according to their responses
on self-report measures. None had any previous knowledge
of the UG. All participants gave informed consent to partici-
pate in the study. The study was approved by the local ethics
committee.
TASK AND STIMULI
Task, stimuli, and experimental set-up were similar to those
employed in a previous psychophysiological study (for details
see Sarlo et al., 2012). Participants underwent a session of
16min. The experimental instructions (see Appendix for an
English-translated instruction sheet) can be subsumed as follows:
participants played as responders. They were told that previous
participants played as proposers and made offers by deciding
how to split the amount of 10 euro at each trial (N = 62) that
had been available by the experimenter. The participant had to
decide either to accept or to reject the offer, by pressing one of
two response keys. If participants accepted the offer, both (pro-
poser and responder) will get the money as suggested, whereas if
they rejected the offer, none of the players would get any of the
money.
Although participants were told that they were interacting
with human proposers, they were actually presented with offers
defined a priori by the experimenter. There were three possible
offers (factor OFFER): unfair [1C], middle [3C], and fair [5C]
(in “1C out of 10” the responder is offered only 1 of the money
at stake). Each offer was framed in two different ways (factor
FRAME: “I give you/I take”). Each participant received the full
range of offers, which were presented in different orders across
subjects, with the constraints that (a) all the three offers should
be presented first, and then repeated, (b) no more than two offers
formulated with the same frame should appear consecutively, (c)
the same amount of money (in the two different frames) should
not be offered consecutively.
Participants were told that the proposers would receive feed-
back only at the end of the experiment (i.e., “covered” UG, which
prevents strategic use of rejections; see Oldfield, 1971; Zamir,
2001; Civai et al., 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012). At the
beginning of the experiment, participants were also told that
their compensation for participating in the experiment would be
proportional to the amount of money gained during the UG.
Instead, irrespective of the task performance, they received the
same amount of money as compensation after completion of the
experiment. The subjects were not informed at the end of the
experiment that we used a flat rate. An informal debriefing was
carried out to assess whether participants believed whether offers
were genuinely human.
EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
Participants lay supine in the MR scanner with their head fix-
ated by firm foam pads. Presentation of the stimuli and their
synchronization with the MR scanner were realized by the soft-
ware Presentation® (version 9.9, Neurobehavioral Systems Inc.,
CA, USA). Stimuli were projected through a VisuaStim Goggles
system (Resonance Technology). Subjects responded by press-
ing the corresponding keys of an MRI-compatible response
device (Lumitouch, Lightwave Medical Industries, Coldswitch
Technologies, Richmond, CA).
For each experimental trial a fixation point (500ms) was
presented, followed by the offer (e.g., “I give you/I take 5C”,
6000ms), after which a 2 s display indicated that the response
(“accept”/”reject”) could be made (“decision slide”). Trials were
intermixed by inter-trial intervals ranging randomly from 3060 to
6720ms with an incremental step of 60ms. Instructions empha-
sized that the participants should press the selected key when the
decision slide appeared on the screen.
Each experimental session included 62 randomized trials,
including 54 experimental trials [3 (GAIN: 1C, 3C, 5C)× 2
(FRAME: “I take,” “I give you”) × 9 repetitions], yielding a total
of 27 offers for each frame condition and 8 trials of no inter-
est (2 offers with gain 2C and 2 offers with gain 4C), were
included for each frame condition in order to represent the full
range of offers the hypothetical proposers would make, while
keeping reasonable the total number of trials (cf. Sarlo et al.,
2012). Therefore, we focused on the trials representing the very
unfair, the mid-value, and the very fair offers, according to pre-
vious studies (Polezzi et al., 2008; Civai et al., 2010). Eight null
events (i.e., blank screens), perceived as a prolongation of the
inter-trial period, were randomly interspersed among the event
trials to increase the power of estimating the BOLD response
(Dale and Buckner, 1997) and 30 s. of low level baseline (i.e.,
fixating a cross placed at the centre of the screen for 15 s at the
beginning and 15 s at the end of the experiment). We therefore
investigated the effect of two factors, GAIN and FRAME. Prior
to the experiment, subjects practised the task outside the scanner
(N = 20 trials): subjects were told that, in order to acquire famil-
iarity with the structure of the task, they had to play some fake
trials on a computer outside the scanner, being informed that the
offers were not real, and the subject was told that they wouldn’t
have been calculated in the final payoff. The offers could take any
amount.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION
A 3.0-T Philips Achieva (Philips Medical System, Netherlands)
whole-body scanner was used to acquire T1-weighted anatomi-
cal images and functional images using a SENSE-Head-8 chan-
nel head coil and a custom-built head restrainer to minimize
head movements. Functional images were obtained using a
T2∗-weighted echo-planar image (EPI) sequence of the whole
brain. EPI volumes for the main experiment (N = 455, lasting
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14.2min) contained 30 transverse axial slices (repetition time,
TR = 2000ms; echo time, TE = 35ms, field of view, FOV =
23 cm, acquisition matrix: 128 × 128, slice thickness: 3mm
with no gaps, 90◦ flip angle, voxel size: 1.79 × 1.79 × 3mm)
and were preceded by 5 dummy scans that allowed the MR
signal to reach a steady state. After functional neuroimag-
ing, high-resolution anatomical images were acquired using a
T1-weighted 3-D magnetization-prepared, rapid acquisition gra-
dient fast filed echo (T1W 3D TFE SENSE) pulse sequence (TR =
8.2ms, TE = 3.76ms, FOV = 24 cm, 190 transverse axial slices
of 1mm thickness, 8◦ flip angle, voxel size: 1 × 1 × 1mm) lasting
8.8min.
fMRI DATA PROCESSING ANDWHOLE BRAIN ANALYSIS
fMRI data pre-processing and statistical analysis were performed
on UNIX workstations (Ubuntu 8.04 LTS, i386, http://www.
ubuntu.com/) using MATLAB r2007b (The Mathworks Inc.,
Natick, MA/USA) and SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping
software, SPM; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK). Dummy scans were discarded before further image
processing. Preprocessing included spatial realignment of the
images to the reference volume of the time series, segmenta-
tion producing the parameter file used for normalization of
functional data to a standard EPI template of the Montreal
Neurological Institute template provided by SPM5, re-sampling
to a voxel size of 2 × 2 × 2mm, and spatial smoothing with a
6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel to meet the statistical require-
ments of the General Linear Model and to compensate for resid-
ual macro-anatomical variations across subjects. We performed a
whole brain random effects analysis closely following the model
previously used by some of us (Civai et al., 2012), with FRAME
and the RESPONSE TYPE (i.e., reject or accept) as factors to
account for neural activations related to accepting or making a
rejection for offers proposed as different frames. This analysis
counted 13/17 subjects, because it was necessary that all the sub-
jects considered had rejections in both the frames in order to
perform an ANOVAwithout empty cells. We calculated the num-
ber of cells for each condition. There was amean of 16, 56 ± 9, 15,
12, 17 ± 8, 67, 15, 06 ± 9, 82, and 13, 28 ± 9, 39 cells for each of
the four conditions: I TAKE_ACCEPT; I TAKE_REJECT; I GIVE
YOU_ACCEPT; I GIVE YOU_REJECT, respectively. Importantly,
the mean number of cells did not differ significantly across exper-
imental conditions [frame, F(1, 12) = 3.37, p = 0.089, n.s.; resp
type, F(1, 12) = 1.012, p = 0.33, n.s.; frame × resp type interac-
tion, F(1, 12) = 0.01, p = 0.90, n.s.], thus cells were comparable
between conditions. On the first-level analysis, we modeled as the
regressors of main interest the response types (accept/reject) and
the frames “I take” and “I give you” (I_take/accept, I_take/reject,
I_give_you/accept, and I_give_you/reject) and their temporal
derivative. We also included the motor response as a further
regressor of no interest In addition, to correct for motion arti-
facts, subject-specific realignment parameters were modeled as
covariates of no interest. Low-frequency signal drifts were fil-
tered using a cut-off period of 128 s. At the single subject level,
specific effects were assessed by applying appropriate linear con-
trasts to the parameter estimates of the experimental condi-
tions resulting in t-statistics for each voxel. For the second-level
random effects analyses, contrast images obtained from individ-
ual participants were entered into a one-sample t-test to create
a SPM{T}, indicative of significant activations specific for this
contrast at the group level. We used a threshold of p < 0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level [using
family-wise error (FWE)], with a height threshold at the voxel
level of p < 0.001, uncorrected. The anatomical localization of
the functional imaging results was performed using the SPM
Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005). To reveal the nature
of the interactions, beta-values were extracted using the rfx-
plot toolbox (Glascher, 2009) implemented in SPM5. t-tests
were performed over the extracted percentage signal change val-
ues to further investigate the functional properties of the areas
of activation. Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS 14.0
software.
Finally, data were analyzed by using a second design matrix
accounting for effects of the FRAME and the GAIN as factors,
following the model previously used by some of us (Civai et al.,
2012). We modeled the offers as a categorical factor with 3 lev-
els fair (5C), middle (3C), and unfair (1C) yielding to a 2 × 3
factorial design with six conditions and their temporal derivative.
The rest of the analysis was carried out as in the first model. With
respect to the effect of frame, in this analysis we were interested
at the contrast gain 5: “I take” vs. “I give you.” We reasoned that
“gain 5C” could represent a good testing condition for investigat-
ing the frame effect, since it is an equal fair offer and the effect
of frame on the perception of unfairness should be null; find-
ing an effect of “I take” vs. “I give you” frames for gain 5 would
strengthen the idea that the way offers are framed influence how
people perform the task.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF BEHAVIORAL DATA
SPSS for Windows (version 14.0) was used for performing a
repeated measure ANOVA with within-subject factors type of
“frame” (“I take,” “I give you”) and “gain” (1C, 3C, 5C) on the
subjects’ rejection rates and response times (RTs) data. All post-
hoc comparisons between single factors were carried out using
LSD Fisher’s test (α ≤ 0.05).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
At the debriefing, all participants reported that they believe the
offers came from genuine humans.
Rejection rates
We found a significant main effect of gain, F(2, 32) = 23.91,
p < 0.001, with significantly less rejections for gain 5C vs. 1C
(mean ± sem, 7.18 ± 4.43 vs. 75.8 ± 10.53, p < 0.001), and for
5C vs. 3C (7.18 ± 4.43 vs. 52.2 ± 11.65, p < 0.002) compared
with 3C vs. 1C (52.2 ± 11.65 vs. 75.8 ± 10.53, p = 0.076, n.s.)
(See Figure 1). The main effect of frame [F(1, 16) = 0.35, p =
0.56] and the frame × gain interaction [F(2, 32) = 0.8, p = 0.45]
were not significant.
Identical effects were found also when we removed from the
analysis four participants who never rejected an offer, because
it was necessary that all the subjects considered had rejections
in both the frames in order to perform an ANOVA without
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FIGURE 1 | Behavioral data. Reaction time (A) and accuracy (B) data for performing the UG task. Error bars indicate standard error (SEM).
empty cells [frame, F(1, 12) = 0.93, p = 0.76, n.s., η2 = 0.0022;
gain, F(2, 24) = 41.5 p < 0.001 η2 = 0.679, with significantly less
rejections for gain 5C vs. 1C (5.98 ± 16.12 vs. 95.29 ± 15.36,
p < 0.001), and for 5C vs. 3C (5.98 ± 16.12 vs. 64.42 ± 45.08,
p < 0.002) compared with 3C vs. 1C (64.42 ± 45.08 vs. 95.29 ±
15.36, p = 0.070, n.s.); frame × gain, F(2, 24) = 0.94, p = 0.40,
n.s. η2 = 0.0201].
fMRI RESULTS
Task-related network
The extensive network of areas recruited by the task (task >
implicit baseline contrast) involved clusters of activity in: (i) the
cerebellum bilaterally, extending to the inferior and to the supe-
rior temporal gyrus, the amygdala, the insula and the superior
parietal lobe; (ii) the left middle temporo-occipital gyrus; (iii)
the middle cingulate cortex, extending to the left supplemen-
tary motor area (SMA); (iv) the superior frontal gyrus bilaterally,
extending to the right SMA; and (v) the middle frontal gyrus
bilaterally (see Figure 2A, Table 1).
Effects of the FRAME and RESPONSE TYPE (i.e., reject or accept)
Figure 2 show the fMRI results for the response-related effects:
network of areas differentially recruited by response “reject” (rel-
ative to “accept”) for frame “I give you” (B) and for frame “I
take.” (C) For the main effect of frame: “I take” vs. “I give you”
(and vice versa), no differential activation was found at the pre-
defined statistical threshold. Based on previous neuroimaging
studies on the framing effect described in the introduction (De
Martino et al., 2006), we hypothesized that emotional areas such
as anterior insula and amygdala, were involved in processing the
frame; moreover, further imaging studies reported activations
in the operculo/insular cortex associated with pain processing
(e.g., Lötsch et al., 2012) and in interoceptive awareness and the
representation of visceral responses associated with emotional sit-
uations (Lamm et al., 2007). Thus, a hypothesis-driven region of
interest (ROI) analysis (Friston, 1997) was performed in which
we tested significant increases of neural activity in the oper-
culo/insular cortex [Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005)], for
the main effect of frame. We found significant activation within
the operculo/insular cortex bilaterally associated with the frame “I
take” vs. “I give you.” No differential activation was found for the
reverse comparisons (see Figure 2D, Table 1). In the ROI analysis
performed on the amygdala [Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al.,
2005)] for the main effect of frame we did not found significant
activation within this area.
Frame× response type interaction: [(FRAME_I take: Accept>
Reject)>(FRAME_I give you: Accept> Reject)] (and vice versa)
The frame “I take” for accepted trials (vs. rejected) controlled for
the frame “I give you,” differentially activated (i) the right pre-
cuneus, extending to the right superior parietal lobe (Area 7a),
(ii) the right rolandic operculum/insular cortex, (iii) the right
calcarine gyrus, extending to the right cuneus, (iv) the right supe-
rior temporal gyrus, (v) the left superior parietal lobe (Area 7a)
extending to the left Area 2, and (vi) the left anterior cingulate (see
Figure 3, Table 1). This interaction was due to an increase of neu-
ral activity for accepting frame “I take” vs. rejecting (p = 0.008,
p = 0.022, p = 0.001, p = 0.023, p = 0.011, p = 0.04, respec-
tively), which was significantly higher than that associated with
accepting frame “I give you” vs. rejecting (p = 0.09, p = 0.08, p =
0.09, p = 0.1, p = 0.1, p = 0.08, n.s., respectively). No differen-
tial activation was found at the predefined statistical threshold for
the reverse comparisons.
Gain-related effects
This model accounted for effects of the FRAME (i.e., “I take,” “I
give you”) and the GAIN [i.e., fair (5C) middle (3C) and unfair
(1C)] factors. Irrespective of frame, unfair (1C) gain [vs. middle
gain (3C)], differentially activated the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC). Furthermore, fair (5C) gain [vs. middle gain (3C)], dif-
ferentially activated (i) the left superior parietal lobe (Area 7a),
extending to the precuneus, (ii) the middle cingulate cortex.
For the fair (5C) gain, the frame “I take” (vs. “I give you”) dif-
ferentially activated the left occipito-temporal junction and the
middle temporal gyrus (see Figure 4, Table 2). No differential
activation was found at the predefined statistical threshold for the
other comparisons (see Table 2).
We performed also an analysis by including a parametric mod-
ulator for the factor “gain.” The parametric approach did not yield
significant results at the predefined threshold.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Common neural networks associated with the UG
task; network of areas differentially recruited by response “reject”
in green (relative to “accept,” in red) for frame “I give you” (B)
and for frame “I take” (C). Activations are displayed on a
rendered template brain provided by spm5. (D) Insula/rolandic
opercular areas differential recruitment by the frame “I take”
(relative to frame “I give you”) displayed on a single subject
template brain provided by spm5.
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Table 1 | Whole brain analysis for the model accounting for frame and type of response related effects: brain regions showing significant
relative increases of BOLD response associated with the experimental conditions.
Region Side MNI Z Cluster
voxel
x y z
TASK-RELATED NETWORK
Cerebellum R 30 −46 −34 5.65 22,735
Cerebellum L −14 −64 −28 5.40
Insula L −42 12 2 4.97
Insula R 44 4 2 4.90
Amygdala L −12 22 −16 4.77
Amygdala R 36 0 −14 4.71
Inferior temporal gyrus R 56 −30 −14 4.70
Temporal pole L −50 10 −10 4.69
Superior parietal cortex (Area 1) L −50 −20 50 4.68
Superior temporal gyrus L −40 −26 16 4.65
Inferior temporal gyrus R 52 −26 −16 4.55
Middle temporal gyrus L −52 −66 0 4.80 1187
Middle occipital gyrus L −54 −72 14 4.25
Middle cingulate cortex M −2 16 34 4.50 1036
SMA L 2 4 48 3.93
Superior frontal gyrus L −22 16 56 4.42 121
Superior frontal gyrus L −12 −8 72 4.33 306
SMA R 6 2 66 4.02
Middle frontal gyrus R 24 50 26 4.12 249
Superior frontal gyrus R 14 56 24 3.94
Middle frontal gyrus L −28 48 26 3.92 275
Middle frontal gyrus R 26 26 38 3.58 108
Superior frontal gyrus R 24 16 40 3.56
MAIN EFFECT OF TYPE OF FRAME: “I TAKE” > “I GIVE YOU”
Insula, Rolandic operculum L −55 −8 16 4.76* 41
Insula, Rolandic operculum L −38 −8 18 4.22* 45
Insula, Rolandic operculum R 46 −6 16 3.63* 17
(“I TAKE”_ACCEPT > “I TAKE”_REJECT) > (“I GIVE YOU”_ACCEPT > “I GIVE YOU”_REJECT)
Precuneus R 10 −56 48 4.78 431
Superior parietal lobe (Area 7a) R 38 −48 60 4.62
Posterior insula, Rolandic operculum R 44 −14 14 4.66 188
Calcarine gyrus R 24 −60 6 4.07 260
Cuneus R 16 −76 20 3.97
Anterior cingulate L −4 18 22 4.25 59
Superior parietal lobe (Area 7a) L −20 −54 60 4.25 62
Superior parietal lobe (Area 2) L −22 −52 50 4.03
Superior temporal gyrus R 58 −6 4 4.03 63
For each region of activation, the coordinates in MNI space are given in reference to the maximally activated voxel within an area of activation, as indicated by the
highest Z-value (p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level, height threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected). *pSVC < 0.05, corrected. L/R, left/right
hemisphere.
DISCUSSION
In this fMRI study we have investigated the neural mechanisms
underlying the economical decisions people make when the infor-
mation on which they rely is formulated in terms of gain or
loss. Participants played a modified fMRI version of the UG with
different bids preceded by two different frames: the expression
“I give you” (gain) focusing on money the respondent would
receive if she/he agreed with the proponent, and the expression
“I take” (loss) focusing on the money that would be removed
from the respondent in the event that she/he accepted the offer.
Behaviorally, unfair offers were equally often rejected in both con-
ditions. This is different from what was found in the study by
Sarlo et al. (2012) in which participants rejected more when the
offer was framed as a loss rather than as a gain. Our failure to
confirm this result may be due to the smaller sample of subjects
employed in the present study.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 337 | 7
Tomasino et al. Framing and ultimatum game
FIGURE 3 | Areas differentially recruited by the frame × type of
response interaction [(“I take”_Accept > “I take”_Reject) > (“I
give you”_Accept > “I give you”_Reject)]. Group mean
beta-values extracted from each of the activation clusters. The plots
were created by using rfxplot [http://rfxplot.sourceforge.net/, (Glascher,
2009)].
TASK-RELATEDNETWORK
Since the task we used was a modified version (Sarlo et al., 2012)
of the classical UG, we first describe the task-related network.
Overall, the network that was associated with the task included
clusters of activation in key areas which have been classically
found in previous studies investigating the neural underpinning
of the UG (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003; van’t Wout et al., 2005; Knoch
et al., 2006, 2008; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Tabibnia et al., 2008;
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FIGURE 4 | Occipito-temporal junction differentially recruited by gain 5€_“I take” (relative to 5€_“I give you”). The plot were created by using rfxplot
[http://rfxplot.sourceforge.net/, (Glascher, 2009)].
Moretti et al., 2009; Güroðlu et al., 2010, 2011; Civai et al., 2012;
Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012), such as the insular cortex bilat-
erally, the middle cingulate cortex, the superior frontal and the
middle frontal gyri bilaterally, the inferior and superior tempo-
ral lobe. Interestingly, the task-related network included also the
amygdala bilaterally, known to be related to the mediation of
aggressive responses (Nelson and Trainor, 2007) and of biasing
decision-making (Bechara et al., 2003; De Martino et al., 2006),
and it has been found activated also in a previous fMRI study on
the UG (Gospic et al., 2011).
Structures normally involved in mental calculation (Rickard
et al., 2000; Zago et al., 2001; Hanakawa et al., 2003), such as
the right parietal and the right precuneus, were significantly acti-
vated in the frame-by-decision interaction, in which the respon-
der takes but, in this condition, the player accepts. When one
accepts in the loss frame, one deviates more from her “expected”
response. This deviation from the behavior we expect from
her, could be accompanied by an increase of mental calculation
resources and processing.
Importantly, all these activations have been always related
to processes such as emotional processing (Sanfey et al., 2003),
theory of mind (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith,
2006), cognitive processing (Sanfey et al., 2003) such as exec-
utive control, goal maintenance, and the monitoring/control
of one’s emotional responses (van’t Wout et al., 2005; Knoch
et al., 2006, 2008; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Moretti et al., 2009;
Güroðlu et al., 2010, 2011; Baumgartner et al., 2011) triggered by
the task.
FRAME BY DECISION INTERACTION IN THE OPERCULO-INSULAR
CORTEX AND THE ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX
Despite the lack of significant interaction at the behavioral level,
at the neural level we observed a frame-by-response interaction,
revealing an increase of neural activity in the right rolandic oper-
culum/insular cortex. This interaction was due to an increase of
neural activity for accepting frame “I take” vs. rejecting, which
was significantly higher than that associated with accepting frame
“I give you” vs. rejecting. Interestingly a hypothesis-driven ROI
analysis performed for testing significant increases of neural
activity in the operculo/insular cortex, showed a significant acti-
vation within the operculo/insular cortex bilaterally associated
with the frame “I take” vs. “I give you.” Sanfey et al. (2003) found
that a stronger activation in the anterior part of the insula when
evaluating an unfair offer was associated to rejections. In contrast,
in our study we found a stronger activation in the posterior part
of the insula for accepting (compared with rejecting) the frame
“I take” vs. “I give you.” We interpreted the acceptance effect we
found as related to a discrepancy between expected response and
my decision [see also Güroðlu et al. (2010), for a similar inter-
pretation]. Our results extend the interpretation of the role of
the insula put forward by Sanfey et al. (2003) and suggest that
this region may be characterized by two different functions: the
anterior part of the insula might evaluate the outcome, while the
posterior part of the insula might evaluate the response to the
outcome. Based on our findings we can add that the posterior
insula is also sensitive to the frame in which offers have been
formulated.
Our cluster of activation in the operculo-insular cortex is local-
ized more posterior than the usual one found in the anterior
insula in UG fMRI studies, e.g., Sanfey et al. (2003) and also
the one found in previous studies performed by some of us
(Civai et al., 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2012). Nevertheless,
it has been shown that among other regions, such as the tha-
lamus, the insular, anterior cingulate, primary and secondary
somatosensory, premotor and supplementary motor cortices, the
operculo-insular cortex is a crucial part of the painmatrix (Treede
et al., 1999; Peyron et al., 2000; Apkarian et al., 2005; Bingel and
Tracey, 2008). This is particularly relevant since the activation
found in the anterior insula during the UG have been classically
interpreted as unfair offers triggering negative emotions, given
that many studies have found a crucial involvement of this area
in processing emotional states, pain and distress (Damasio et al.,
2000; Calder et al., 2001; Wicker et al., 2003; Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2011). Evidence for the operculo-insular cortex involvement
in pain processing came from studies using PET, evoked poten-
tials or fMRI techniques (Peyron et al., 2002; Frot et al., 2007;
Baumgartner et al., 2010; Oertel et al., 2012), and from studies
involving direct stimulation of this area (Mazzola et al., 2009)
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Table 2 | Whole brain analysis for the model accounting for frame and
for gain effects: brain regions showing significant relative increases
of BOLD response associated with the experimental conditions.
Region Side MNI Z Cluster
voxel
x y z
MAIN EFFECT OF FRAME: “I TAKE” vs. “I GIVE YOU”
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF FRAME: “I GIVE YOU” vs. “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 1€ > 3€
Anterior cingulate cortex R 18 4 32 6.51 150
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 3€ > 1€
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 1€ > 5€
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 5€ > 1€
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 3€ > 5€
– – – – – – –
MAIN EFFECT OF GAIN: 5€ > 3€
Superior parietal lobe
(Area 7a)
L −12 −60 58 4.49 619
Precuneus L −4 −58 54 3.92
Middle cingulate cortex M −4 0 40 4.11 125
GAIN 5: “I TAKE” > “I GIVE YOU”
Occipito-temporal junction L −56 −62 8 3.84 159
Middle temporal gyrus L −62 −56 8 3.81
GAIN 5: “I GIVE YOU” > “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
GAIN 1: “I GIVE YOU” > “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
GAIN 1: “I GIVE YOU” > “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
GAIN 3: “I GIVE YOU” > “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
GAIN 3: “I GIVE YOU” > “I TAKE”
– – – – – – –
For each region of activation, the coordinates in MNI space are given in reference
to the maximally activated voxel within an area of activation, as indicated by the
highest Z-value (p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level,
height threshold p < 0.001, uncorrected). L/R, left/right hemisphere. As all the
values are value p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster
level, height threshold p < 0.001.
and of the insular cortex (Mazzola et al., 2006). Other authors
have previously found activation in a cluster localized more pos-
terior than the anterior insula. In one of those studies, the authors
(Wright et al., 2011) used amodified version of the UG and varied
the social context, by inducing thus a bias in participants accep-
tance of objectively identical offers. They found that the objective
social inequality was integrated with social context in posterior
andmid-insula. Consistently, in another study (Hsu et al., 2008) it
has been shown that posterior insula activity negatively correlated
with inequality.
The frame × response type interaction contrast included also
the fair C5 offers. We ruled out the possibility that the fair C5
offers drove the effect, since the rejection rates for fair C5 offers
in the “I take” frame did not significantly differ from the frame
“I give.” We also would like to argue that gain 5C, being the most
equal gain, is the condition that more than the others shows the
frame effect: precisely because it is an equal and fair offer, the
effect of frame should be null. Instead, we found that the activa-
tion in the OT junction was significantly modulated by the effect
of frame for fair, C5 offers.
In our study the activation of the operculo-insular cortex was
significantly increased when participants accepted (vs. rejected)
the offers presented in the frame “I take,” as compared to the
frame “I give you.” We reasoned that in the loss frame one should
be more prone to reject with respect to the gain frame; it fol-
lows that when participants accept in the loss frame they deviate
more from their “expected” response, even though this interpre-
tation is speculative, as we cannot provide behavioral evidence
to support the expectancy hypothesis. Accordingly, the operculo-
insular cortex might signal this deviation from participants’ own
expected behavior. It has been proposed that the equal treat-
ment is a default social norm, and its violation is signaled by
the anterior insula (Civai et al., 2012). Further evidence support-
ing the view that the anterior insula signals the level of inequity
aversion, and, more broadly, norm violations came also from
another fMRI study (Hsu et al., 2008) in agreement with the idea
that anterior insula plays a critical role in detecting social norm
violations (Spitzer et al., 2007; King-Casas et al., 2008; Strobel
et al., 2011), thus extending its role beyond emotional involve-
ment (Sanfey et al., 2003). Importantly, it has been shown that
the frame “I take,” by acting as a loss frame, elicited the char-
acteristic defensive response pattern that is evoked by aversive
stimulation, in which increases in skin conductance are coupled
with increases in heart rate (Güth et al., 1982; Sarlo et al., 2012).
To sum up, the role of the anterior insula in the UG in the stud-
ies reviewed above is comparable with the one we found in the
operculo-insular cortex. In addition, we add that the operculo-
insular cortex is modulated by the frame in which the offers are
formulated.
A further interpretation might be that operculo-insular cortex
activation could be somewhat related to processes of agency-
attribution and/or adoption of an egocentric vs. allocentric refer-
ence frame, and the effect may arise from the “linguistic” context
involving the proposer alone (“I take”) or the proposer along
with the responder (“I give you”), thus modulating the activity of
mechanisms of self-other distinction that are associated with pos-
terior insula and rolandic operculum (see Vogeley and Fink, 2003;
Sperduti et al., 2011). In our study, the activation of the operculo-
insular cortex was significantly increased when participants were
processing the frame “I take,” as compared to the frame “I give
you” and accepted (vs. rejected) the offers. Here agency has to be
attributed to the person to whom the proposal of how to split the
money is made, independent of the frame “give” or “take.” This
might appear in contrast with the role played by the insula in
first person perspective attribution (see Vogeley and Fink, 2003;
Sperduti et al., 2011) unless the player imagine changing his own
perspective in to the proposer’s one.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 337 | 10
Tomasino et al. Framing and ultimatum game
Consistently with previous studies in which the ACC showed
an increased activation for unfair compared with fair offers, e.g.,
Sanfey et al. (2003), we found an increased activation in the
ACC for unfair 1C as compared to mid-value 3C gains. Some
authors, e.g., Sanfey et al. (2003) argued that the ACC has been
implicated in detection of cognitive conflict (Botvinick et al.,
1999; MacDonald et al., 2000), and the activation of the ACC
in the context of the UG is related to the conflict between cog-
nitive and emotional motivations. As a new feature, we also
found that the ACC activation in the frame by response inter-
action, with increased activation for accepting (vs. rejecting)
gains presented in the frame “I take,” as compared to those
presented in the frame “I give you,” which corresponds to the
most unfair condition, albeit participants accept that the proposer
takes money. This condition might trigger a conflict between
cognitive and emotional motivations, which in turns activates
the ACC. It has been suggested that together with the insula,
the ACC activation might be related to behavior that deviates
from participants’ personal standards (Güroðlu et al., 2011). It
has been shown that, by varying degrees of intentionality, the
ACC activation was increased for accepting unfair offers in the
no-alternative context and for rejecting an unfair offer in fair-
and hyperfair-alternative contexts (Güroðlu et al., 2011). Taken
together, these results indicate that accepting that the proposer
takes the money, independent of the gain, is indeed a deviant
choice with respect to what one normally does (Güroðlu et al.,
2011).
IMPLICIT MENTAL SIMULATIONMECHANISMS TRIGGERED BY THE UG
That the UG could trigger mechanisms related to mental sim-
ulation has never been proposed. With the term simulation we
refer to the mental process by which people mentally visual-
ize, or move or feel and experience situations, which occurs
in the absence of the appropriate external stimuli or sensory
input (mental imagery is sometimes colloquially referred to as
“visualizing,” “seeing in the mind’s eye,” “hearing in the head,”
“imagining the feel of,” etc.) (Kosslyn et al., 1995a, 2001). It
has been largely accepted that people use mental imagery, for
instance, during memory retrieval, problem solving, producing
descriptions, mental practice, and motivational states (Kosslyn,
1980). Thus, a mental process involving a first or third person
perspective could well be carried out through imagery (Vogeley
et al., 2004). Importantly, mental imagery can occur after explicit
instructions (Jeannerod, 1999) but it can also be implicitly
triggered (Jeannerod and Frak, 1999); implicit mental imagery
occurs when subjects, even if they receive no instruction to
imagine, unconsciously imagine the scene or the action while
performing another task, e.g., during mental rotation of body
parts (e.g., Zacks et al., 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2001), handedness
recognition of a visually presented hand (e.g., Parsons and Fox,
1998), judgment as to whether an action would be easy, difficult
or impossible (Johnson et al., 2002), or recognizing and under-
standing actions of other individuals (e.g., Johnson et al., 2002).
In performing the UG, although subjects received no instruc-
tion to do so, they could represent in their mind of the imagine
the action associated with the task. That individuals imagine
the situations as if they were real and feel pain when the most
disadvantageous conditions are encountered could well explain
why regions found associated in processing pain such as the
opercular/insular cortex were found activated when subjects per-
formed the UG. It is conceivable that while performing the UG
the participants (implicitly) simulate sensations, actions, emo-
tions, anticipating the action consequences, switch between first
and third person perspective, although not instructed to do so.
Accordingly, in our study we found significant clusters of acti-
vation in areas involved in mental imagery, strongly suggesting
that one of the mechanisms supporting the UG performance
could well be mental imagery. Indeed, at variance with the results
previously found in fMRI studies on the UG, interestingly the
task-related network included also a significant activation in
the left superior parietal cortex, which was localized in the pri-
mary somatosensory area (Area 1). This activation is typically
found in studies in which subjects actually experience the sen-
sation or the movement, or when they imaging them (Tomasino
et al., 2010). This finding may be interpreted as if the subjects
implicitly simulated the gain/loss. Somatoperception corresponds
to the process of perceiving the body itself, and particularly
of ensuring somatic perceptual constancy (Longo et al., 2010).
The somatosensory cortex is reported in studies requiring map-
ping of subjective feeling states arising from bodily responses
(Critchley et al., 2004). It is relevant here the role of somatosen-
sory cortices in sensory imagery of affectively-significant states.
Somatosensory-based memories can be reactivated by the ante-
rior emotion network (Damasio, 1994). It has been shown that
repetitive transcranialmagnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the face S1
representation impaired recognition of facial emotional expres-
sions (Pitcher et al., 2008) and that the observation of erotic
images or mutilated bodies as compared to neutral items acti-
vated the right SI and SII (Rudrauf et al., 2009). The S1 activation
during the UG task thus might be related both to an increased
attention to one’s bodily states as if the neural representation of
the experiencing subject’s body is a vehicle of their emotional
experience (Longo et al., 2010). The UG is a self-centered task,
thus it is reasonable that the left S1 and area 2 activations might
reflect mental imagery of the sensations they would physically
experienced during the UG.
With respect to the parietal lobe, we found that the left
superior parietal lobe (Area 7a) was significantly activated inde-
pendent of the frame in which offers were formulated, i.e., “I give
you” or “I take” by gain 5C as compared to 3C, thus for equal
offers. In addition, the left area 7a was significantly activated by
the frame by decision interaction, in which the responder takes
but this time the player accepts. When you accept in the loss frame
you deviate more from your “expected” response. It is not only the
insula signaling this deviation from your own expected behavior,
but also area 7, which has been related to egocentric (body- and
body part-centered) coordinates coding (Makin et al., 2007), to
the processing of multimodal integrated spatial representations
in body-centered coordinates (Felician et al., 2004) and to updat-
ing postural representations of the upper limb (Pellijeff et al.,
2006). In a previous study, some of us found that the left posterior
IPS codes an allocentric, but not egocentric, visual model of
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the body (the body structural description) (Corradi-Dell’Acqua
et al., 2009). Taken together, these studies suggest that a left area
7a activation may reflect a continuous updating of egocentric
and allocentric coordinates while playing the UG. Another sub-
region of the left parietal lobe we found activated in the frame
by decision interaction was area 2, which is a somatosensory
area, e.g., Grefkes and Fink (2005). The cluster of activation in
area 7a extended including also the left precuneus. This region
has been found activated in studies addressing episodic mem-
ory and the creation of imaginary or future personal scenarios
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Buckner and Carroll, 2007). It is
possible that participants implicitly imagine the offers in terms
of past or hypothetical future scenarios and fictive losses, see
Kirk et al. (2011), or they could implicitly simulated situations
in which the responder takes and the player accepts shifting from
a 1st or a 3rd person perspective imagery (Ruby and Decety,
2001).
We also found that the left occipito-temporal junction was
activated for the equal offer (“I take” vs. “I give you” for gain
5C). Our coordinates of the left occipito-temporal junction
cluster are in the proximity to previously reported locations
of extrastriate body area (EBA) in human brain (Arzy et al.,
2006; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2009). Previous studies impli-
cated the EBA by many body-part related processes including
self-generated (Astafiev et al., 2004) and goal-directed (Takahashi
et al., 2008) movements, as well as reaching to kinesthetically
defined targets (Darling et al., 2007) and during imagery of the
tool-use in near and far space (Tomasino et al., 2012). In this
vein, the occipito-temporal activation clusters are modulated by
the equal offer 5C, which can be hypothesized as being more
unpleasant by the frame “I take” where is the proposer tak-
ing the money. Accordingly, the activation could be related to
the generation of an action that might be considered a social
confrontation, such a rejection. In the same line, it has been
shown that activation of the middle occipito-temporal cortex was
modulated by emotional and social information while partici-
pants viewed and categorized affective pictures that varied on
two dimensions: emotional content (i.e., neutral, emotional) and
social content (i.e., faces/people, objects/scenes) (Norris et al.,
2004).
We found that the right calcarine gyrus and the right cuneus
were significantly activated by the frame by decision interaction,
in which the responder takes but this time the player accepts. We
can exclude that this activation is related to visual processing of
the stimuli since it is a product of the interaction term. Rather,
we suggest that in this condition there is an increase of implicit
visual imaginary processes, as described above, which triggers
an increase of activation in areas related to visual imagery of
scenes and characters (Kosslyn et al., 1995a,b, 2001; Kosslyn and
Thompson, 2003), and an increase of activation in areas related
to episodic memory retrieval during imagery such as the cuneus
(Fletcher et al., 1995). It has been shown that V1 can be acti-
vated whenever images are formed, even if they are not necessarily
used to perform a task (Klein et al., 2000). In that study, authors
(Klein et al., 2000) used event-related fMRI to detect and charac-
terize the activity in the calcarine sulcus during mental imagery.
The results revealed reproducible transient activity in this area
whenever participants generated or evaluated a mental image.
This transient activity was strongly enhanced when participants
evaluated characteristics of objects, whether or not details actu-
ally needed to be extracted from the image to perform the task
(Klein et al., 2000). Interestingly, it has been shown that func-
tional activation was larger in the right than the left hemisphere
and larger in the occipital than in the occipitoparietal regions
during processing of a series of pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant
pictures (Lang et al., 1998). Importantly, both emotional and neu-
tral pictures produced activity centered on the calcarine fissure,
only emotional pictures also produced sizable clusters bilater-
ally in the occipital gyrus and in the right fusiform gyrus (Lang
et al., 1998), and we argue probably related to implicit imagery
processes.
To conclude, we argue that areas involved in imaginary task
were found activated by our version of the UG, mainly in the
frame by decision interaction, in which the responder takes and
the player accepts. This condition corresponds to a loss frame, and
here participants deviate from their “expected” response. Thus,
deviation from participants’ own expected behavior are signaled
not only by the posterior insula/rolandic operculum but also trig-
ger an increase of activation in areas related to mental imagery.
Our findings extend the current understanding of the neural sub-
strate of social decision making, by disentangling the structures
sensitive to the way in which the information is formulated, i.e.,
framing effect, in terms of gain or loss, which influences people’s
decisions.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS
During the experiment you will be asked to take part to the
present scenario.
Another participant has been given the amount of 10 euro and
that he/she has to decide how to split the amount of 10 euro with
you. You cannot negotiate the proposal. You have the possibility
to accept or reject the proposal, considering that:
• if you accept the offer, both (you and the proposer) will get the
money as suggested;
• if you reject the offer, none of you would get any of the money.
Our study aim at observing the behavior of both the proposers,
i.e., who proposes how to split the amount of money, and of the
responder, who are asked to decide whether accepting or rejecting
the offers.
In the past month we have involved (and scanned) a number of
participants, asked to decide how they would split the amount of
10 euros, considering the rules mentioned above. The offers that
you will be presented with, are therefore the proposals made by
these participants.
All the participants, both the proposers and those who partici-
pated as responders like you, will receive a fixed compensation for
participating in the experiment corresponding to 15 euro, plus a
compensation equal to 10% of the amount of money gained.
You will not be able to identify the offers made by the sin-
gle previous participants since the different proposals will be
presented in a random order. The program will allow the exper-
imenter only to load later on the offers made by the single
proposers so to assign them the respective compensation.
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